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Abstract 
Previous studies have shown that simply knowing some players move first 
can affect behavior in games, even when the first-movers' moves are unob­
servable. This observation violates the game-theoretic principle that timing 
of unobserved moves is irrelevant. We extend this work by varying timing 
of unobservable moves in ultimatum bargaining games and "weak link" co­
ordination games. Timing without observability affects both bargaining and 
coordination, but only weakly. The results are consistent with theories that 
allow "virtual observability" of first-mover choices, rather than theories in 
which timing matters only because first-mover advantage is used as a princi­
ple of equilibrium selection. 
*We thank Gary Bolton, Yuval Rottenstreich, participants in the Chicago GSB Behavioral Science 
brown bag lunch workshop, the Wharton Decision Processes workshop, and the 1996 Public Choice 
Society meeting for ideas, and NSF grant SBR 95-11001 for financial support. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a game in which somebody moved before you, but you don't know what they 
did. Does it matter that they moved already? The standard answer in game theory is 
"No." Perhaps surprisingly, the empirical answer discovered in experiments is "Yes, it 
can matter". This paper adds to the evidence that timing of unobserved moves can 
matter, and reports experiments designed to distinguish two different theories which may 
explain why. 
In noncooperative games of imperfect information, a player's ignorance about the 
move of another player who moved before her is represented in an extensive form game 
tree by linking all the nodes which could result from the other player's earlier moves, in 
an "information set".The same information set representation is used when moves are 
simultaneous. This graphical convention effectively implies that the time at which 
unobservable moves were made doesn't matter. Not knowing A's previous move is 
equivalent to not knowing what A is doing now, or not knowing what A will do. 
Timing-irrelevance is not merely the result of a graphical convention used to draw 
trees. It is an "invisible assumption" in game theory, which follows from the more basic 
principle that if the outcome of an event is unknown, it doesn't matter when the event 
happened-- unobservability trumps timing. Bagwell (1994) makes this point in a 
different way: In a class of games in which there is an advantage to moving first (e.g. , in 
Cournot duopoly), he shows that the commitment value of moving first is severely 
undermined if observability of the earlier move is even slightly in doubt. 
Rapoport (in press) points out that in the earliest development of game theory, von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1947, p. 51) recognized the distinction between "anteriority" 
(priority in time) and "preliminarity" (priority in information). Preliminarity implies 
anteriority, but not vice versa, and thus may seem more fundamental. (Having 
information about a previous move implies the move happened earlier, but an early move 
need not be known.) Having recognized the distinction between timing and 
observability, they opted to make priority in information the basic way of characterizing 
strategies, defined strategies with no reference to chronological order of moves, and 
effectively banished timing, per se, from game theory. 
Several previous experimental studies indicate that even when moves are 
unobservable, timing can matter. Our paper adds to this literature by reporting new 
evidence from ultimatum bargaining games and "weak-link" coordination games. The 
comparison of bargaining and coordination enables us to distinguish two different 
explanations for the effect of timing. The "first mover advantage" theory is that all 
players agree that moving first has an advantage and expect first movers to exploit it, 
even when the first mover's choice will not be observed. A more general explanation, 
which we call "virtual observability", is that players expect first movers to choose 
strategies as if subsequent players observe them perfectly and respond optimally. Note 
that if there is a first mover advantage, the virtual observability explanation predicts that 
it will be exercised. However, virtual observability also predicts timing effects in games 
without first mover advantages. Our evidence suggests the first-mover advantage theory 
is not the whole story and virtual observability may be the better general explanation for 
previous results. 
The effect of timing in natural situations could be important in cases where there is 
first-mover advantage but, for some reason, first movers cannot reveal their moves or 
prefer not to. For example, in announcing new products (with standardization economies 
or network externalities), real-estate development of a small location, or diplomatic 
moves (such as efforts to stabilize a foreign government), players may be able to
establish that they moved first, without revealing the precise details of their moves 
(presumably because they do not want to). In these cases, standard game theory predicts 
that announcing that one has moved, without announcing what the move is, will have the 
same impact as having not moved at all. The data reported here, and theories explaining 
those data, predict moving first may have an impact. An obvious direction for further 
research, therefore, is to search for case studies or examples of naturally occurring timing 
effects. 
II. Previous Results and Explanations
Previously reported timing effects come from games with multiple equilibria, in 
which one equilibrium is preferred by one player and another by a different player. An 
example from Cooper et al (1993) is shown in Table 1. The game is a "battle-of-the­
sexes" in which the row player prefers the Nash equilibrium (2,1) and column prefers the 
equilibrium (1,2). There is also a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which players believe 
others will choose 1 with probability .25 and 2 with probability .75. Note that if players 
move sequentially, and previous moves are observed, the ROW player should choose 2 
and, observing that, COLUMN chooses 1. The player who moves first earns the high 
payoff (600) and the second-mover earns the low payoff. So there is an advantage to 
moving first. 
ROW 
move 
simul. 
seq'l. 
1 
2 
Table 1: Battle�of�the�sexes (BOS) Game 
COLUMN move 
1 
0, 0 
600 200 
35% 65% 
70% 30% 
2 
200,600 
0 0
2 
choice frequencies 
simultaneous sequential 
38% 12% 
62% 88% 
The choice frequencies in Table 1 show that when moves were simultaneous both 
players approached the mixed-strategy equilibrium, choosing strategy 2 either 62% 
(ROW) or 65% (COLUMN) of the time. In the sequential condition, ROW moved first 
and the order of moves was commonly known, but ROW's move was not known to 
COLUMN. Then ROW players chose strategy 2 88% of the time and, more strikingly, 
COLUMN players chose strategy 1 70% of the time. Thus, merely knowing that ROW 
moved first caused players to move toward the equilibrium (2,1), which ROW preferred, 
even though COLUMN did not know ROW's previous move when she chose. Similar 
results were conjectured by Kreps (1990, pp. 100-101) and reported in informal 
experiments by Amershi et al (1989) and at least three other investigators (see Cooper et 
al, 1993, footnote 6). 
Rapoport (in press) studied a three-player BOS with payoffs shown in Table 2. In the 
three-player version player 1 prefers the (A,A,A) equilibrium (getting $10), player 2 
prefers the (B,B,B) equilibrium, and player 3 prefers the (C,C,C) equilibrium. As in the
two-player studies mentioned above, players chose in a predetermined order, but did not 
know the moves of the previous players. About 60% of the players chose the strategy 
which gave the first-mover her preferred outcome. The percentages of players choosing 
the first-mover's preferred equilibrium did not vary much across the move order (66.3%, 
62.9%, and 59. 2% for first- through third-movers). An analysis of individual subjects 
indicated that about 40% of the subjects complied with the first-mover's preference 85% 
of the time, and another 20% of the subjects complied 60% of the time. 
Table 2: Three-player BOS game (payoffs in$) 
Player 2 move Player 3 move 
A B c 
Player 1 A 10,6,2 0,0,0 0,0,0 A 
move B 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 
c 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 
Player 2 move Player 3 move 
A B c 
Player 1 . A 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 B 
move B 0,0,0 2,10,6 0,0,0 
c 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 
Player 2 move Player 3 move 
A B c 
Player 1 A 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 c 
move B 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 
c 0,0,0 0,0,0 6,2,10 
A series of papers by Amnon Rapoport (in press) and colleagues report substantial 
timing effects in "resource dilemma" games. In these games, players draw from a 
"common resource pool" of either certain or uncertain size. If the resource pool is 
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overdrawn nobody gets anything. When players move in order and previous moves are 
observable, first-movers take more of the pool, leaving less for later movers. When the 
order of moves is commonly known but the first movers' actual draws are unknown, 
Budescu, Suleiman, and Rapoport (in press) report that first movers do take more and 
later-moving players take less. In a five-player game, first movers draw 28%, third­
movers draw 23%, and last-movers draw 20% of the pool's expected size. These figures 
are close to the corresponding fractions in games where earlier moves are observable, 
which are 34%, 25%, and 20% (Rapoport, Budescu, and Suleiman, 1993). 
In two- and three-player games the results are weaker but still significant (the 
corresponding first- and last-mover fractions are 52% vs. 48%, and 34% vs. 31 %). 
Perhaps more importantly, players generally expect that those moving before them will 
have taken more than those moving after them will take. Since the only pure-strategy 
Nash equilibria involve various divisions of the entire resource pool (or some certainty­
equivalent, when the size of the pool is commonly-unknown), this result is much like the 
BOS result-- first movers get more, even when their moves are unknown. 
Rapoport (in press) also studied a "step-level" or threshold public goods game, in 
which a public good is provided if 4 (or more) out of 7 players contribute. The payoffs 
were chosen so that if exactly three others contribute, a player prefers to contribute; 
otherwise she prefers not to contribute. These games have many pure-strategy equilibria 
in which a subset of four players contribute. In Rapoport's study, as above, players know 
the order in which they choose to contribute but not the contributions of those who 
moved previously. The effect of timing is striking: Only 18% of the first three players 
contribute, but 38% of the last three players contributed. The early-movers seem to 
expect the later-movers to shoulder more of the burden of contributing, and the later­
movers do. 
Explanations of timing effects 
Three explanations spring to mind for why simply knowing that one player moved 
first matters in these games. 
1. First mover advantage: One explanation is that in games with multiple equilibria
(including the BOS game in Table 1), the players solve their coordination problem by
grasping for any asymmetry or "psychologically prominent" focal principle (Schelling, 
1 960) that selects one equilibrium over another. The fact that one player moves first is 
one such feature. Note that if ROW moved first and her move is observable, then (2,1) is 
the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. We would expect ROW to choose 2 and 
COLUMN to begrudgingly best-respond with strategy 1. The first-mover advantage 
theory is that players select an equilibrium by granting ROW the first-mover advantage 
she would gain if her move was observable, even when it is not. Then first-mover 
advantage is a selection principle along with other principles like security, salience or 
focality (Mehta, Starmer & Sugden, 1994), precedent, payoff-dominance (Van Huyck, 
Battalio & Beil 1990), computational complexity (Ho & Weigelt, in press), and loss­
avoidance (Cachon & Camerer, 1996). 
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The first-mover advantage theory can be stated more formally: 
First-mover advantage: Fix a game of imperfect information in which players do not 
observe previous moves. If there are multiple Nash equilibria in this game, and one 
equilibrium is preferred by one player (and disliked by others), then when the game is 
played sequentially without observability of earlier moves, choose the Nash equilibrium 
which the first-mover prefers. 
2. Virtual observability: A more general theory is that players act like earlier players'
moves are "virtually observable": That is, players expect first movers to choose 
strategies as if subsequent players observe them perfectly and respond optimally. This 
idea was first carefully articulated by Amershi, Sadanand, & Sadanand (1989) in a 
refinement of Nash equilibrium they call MAPNASH, for "manipulated Nash 
equilibrium". Heuristically, virtual observability means players erase information sets 
and act like moves will be observable; then they apply subgame perfection. If perfection 
selects a unique equilibrium which is a Nash equilibrium in the actual game (when the 
information sets are restored), they play that one. More formally, 
Virtual observability: Fix a game of imperfect information in which players do not 
observe earlier moves. Erase the information sets and compute the subgame-perfect 
equilibria. Then restore the information sets and check if the subgame-perfect 
equilibrium the first mover prefers is a Nash equilibrium in the restored game. l If so, 
play that equilibrium. If not, ignore timing and play a Nash equilibrium. 
Virtual observability is strictly more general than the first-mover advantage theory. 
The link occurs through subgame perfection. Suppose there are multiple Nash equilibria 
in the simultaneous-move game, the first mover prefers one of them, and that equilibrium 
is subgame perfect as well (e.g. , the first-mover's preferred equilibrium in BOS). Then 
according to virtual observability, that equilibrium will played. Subgame perfection 
creates a natural bias toward (perfect) equilibria that the first mover prefers, since under 
virtual observability she can move confidently expecting the second-mover to best 
1This requirement will rule out equilibria which are subgame perfect when moves are perfectly observed,
but are not Nash equilibria in the simultaneous-move or imperfect-observability games. Consider 
"matching pennies", in which players choose H or T and player 1 (or 2) earns $X (or $0) if they match 
and $0 (or $X) if they mismatch.  With perfect observability, player 1 is doomed and the subgame perfect 
equilbria are (H,H) and (T,T), in which player 1 earns $0. However, these subgame perfect equilibria are 
not Nash equilibria in the game with unobservability restored; hence they are not picked out by virtual 
observability. Similarly , the Cournot duopoly game in Bagwell ( 1 995) would seem to allow a role for 
virtual observabilty, but does not because of the qualification in the second-last sentence in the statement 
above. In Bagwell's example (p 272), the game is 
s c 
s 5 ,2 3 , 1  
c 6,3 4 ,4 
In the observable-move game, ROW commits to S and earns 5 ,  assuming COL best-responds with S. (So 
(S,S) is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium.) But the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move 
game, (C,C), is unique. Virtual observability picks out (S,S) as subgame perfect, but (S,S) is not a Nash 
equilibrium when the information sets are restored; hence, virtual observability does not select (S,S). 
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respond (and, thus, can "force" her most-preferred choice on the second-mover; hence 
the term "manipulated equilibrium" chosen by Amershi et al). So one outcome of virtual 
observability is that first movers will gain an advantage if they can. For example, in 
BOS, (2,1) is the unique perfect equilibrium when ROW moves first and her move is 
observable by COLUMN. Then virtual observability predicts that they will also play 
(2,1) when her move is not observable. (Note well that (2,1) is also a Nash equilibrium in 
the game with information sets restored.) 
Therefore, whenever first-mover advantage predicts an effect of timing, virtual 
observability predicts the same effect. The crucial difference between the first-mover 
advantage theory and virtual observability lies in games where perfection refines a set of 
Nash equilibria, but the perfect equilibrium does not convey a simultaneous advantage to 
the first-mover and disadvantage to the second-mover. Table 3 shows an example, known 
as "stag hunt". In stag hunt both players can move L or H. The equilibrium (H,H) 
Pareto-dominates (L,L), but choosing L is less risky and (L,L) is an equilibrium too. 
Table 3: Stag Hunt Game 
ROW L 
move H 
COLUMN move 
L H 
200,200 200,0 
0,200 600,600 
If the players move sequentially with observability, (H,H) is the unique subgame 
perfect equilibrium in stag hunt, but it does not convey a first-mover advantage per se 
(since it does not benefit the first-mover at the second-mover's expense). Hence, the 
first-mover advantage explanation of timing effects predicts no effect of timing. Virtual 
observability predicts (H,H) will be chosen when one player moves first (even though 
(L,L) is a Nash equilibrium outcome as well). Our experiments below use an n-player 
version of stag hunt, the "weak-link" game, to distinguish the virtual observability and 
first-mover advantage explanations. 
3. Causal illusion & ambi&uity-aversion: Psychologists have written about two
possible complications of timing which might explain effects of timing in games like 
BOS. 
First, "causal illusions" occur when people think that actions they take at time t might 
affect actions of others at time t+ 1, even though there is no apparent causal mechanism 
for such an affect. For example, Morris, Sim & Grotto (1995) report that subjects 
playing a prisoners' dilemma (PD) are more likely to cooperate if they know the player 
they are paired with moves after them than if the other player moves before them. 
Players act as if their cooperative choice can magically induce reciprocal cooperation by 
a player who moves later. Of course, magical thinking is only a causal illusion if players 
moving first are certain that their choices will not be known to later-moving players, and 
if later-moving players are less likely to cooperate, knowing they move second (as seems 
to be the case in Morris et al's data). This sensitivity suggests that careful experimental 
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control is crucial: For example, first movers must not suspect their moves might be 
conveyed to second movers. This control may be harder to maintain over long 
experimental spans-- e.g., if first-movers are told second-movers are moving days or 
weeks later-- and is easy to maintain over short spans (within a single session), so clearly 
further study is needed. 
In the BOS experiments of Cooper et al (1993), the causal illusion account predicts 
that first movers will mistakenly believe that by choosing 2 they can induce second­
movers to choose 1. But in fact, most COLUMN players !ill choose 1 without knowing
that ROW players choose 2, so the presumption of causality is not an illusion. Similarly, 
the players who move first in resource dilemma games may take more resources, 
thinking their choice can causally influence later movers to take less-- and later movers 
do take less! Since the first-mover's belief is largely fulfilled, it is more natural to 
interpret the (2,1) pattern that results when ROW player moves first (but unobservably), 
or the pattern of declining draws from a resource pool, as a selection principle or a 
heuristic like virtual unobservability, rather than as a causal illusion which is not an 
illusion. 
A second psychological difference arising from timing is that players who move later 
know there is information they could have-- what earlier players chose-- but do not. 
They may feel more regret if they make a mistake in this situation (since there is
something they "could have known"), then if they make an equivalent mistake moving 
first. 2 Heightened regret can then cause them to act as if they are more averse to
uncertainty or ambiguity (see Camerer & Weber, 1992) when they move second. 
The conjunction of ambiguity-aversion, and increased ambiguity when moving 
second, will shift second-movers away from the equilibrium (2,1) toward a 50-50 
mixture of strategies 1 and 2, and will shift later-mover requests downward in resource 
dilemmas (compared to first-movers). Since there is some evidence of both of these 
shifts, there is modest evidence for ambiguity-aversion. Our new experiments allow us 
to observe ambiguity-aversion too but do not test for its effects as directly as possible. A 
direct test, conducted by Camerer & Karjalainen (1994) finds modest evidence of 
ambiguity-aversion. 3
2 Social psychological studies find that subjects assign more blame to people who moved later in a causal
sequence than to those who moved earlier-- e.g. , players who make mistakes in the final seconds of a 
sports event are routinely blamed more than those who make early mistakes (see Miller & Gunasegaram,
1 990). Similarly, the "last clear chance" principle in tort law assigns legal blame to whomever had the 
last chance to prevent an accident. 
3In Camerer & Karjalainen ( 1994), COLUMN could choose a random device yielding $5 for ROW and
$0 for COLUMN (denoted (5,0)) or (0,5) with equal probability, or could play a "mismatching pennies" 
game in which players chose A or B and the payoff was (5,0) if their choices matched and (0,5) if they 
did not match .  The mismatching game has a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium in which both players 
believe others will choose A and B with equal probability; note that the payoff from that equlibrium is 
the same as the paoff from the random device. When COLUMN players got to move first (with 
unobservable moves), they were somewhat more likely to play A or B than when they moved second. 
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The relation between coordination and bargaining 
Our experiments seek to understand timing effects by adding observations from two 
new types of games-- bargaining and "weak-link" coordination. There is an important 
relation between coordination and bargaining which partly motivates our interest in 
timing and bargaining. 
Theorists have long recognized the inherent coordination problem present in most 
bargaining. For example, Schelling (1960, p. 69) points out that "the fundamental 
problem in tacit bargaining is that of coordination." In any game with a range of 
mutually acceptable outcomes, players seek to coordinate on one of those outcomes-­
since failing to agree results in an outcome that is worse for both-- while striving to get 
the most for themselves. 
One widely studied bargaining game in which the issue of coordination has not been 
given much attention is ultimatum bargaining. In the ultimatum game two players must 
divide a sum of money X. The first player (labeled the proposer) offers some portion of 
xCEX to the second player (labeled the responder) . If the responder accepts the offer then 
the responder receives x and the proposer receives X - x. If the responder rejects the offer
then both players receive nothing. For simplicity we assume that the proposer must offer 
the respondent at least some small amount e>O (i.e., responders would not accept zero). 
A typical result from many experiments is that proposers offer around 40% of the 
amount being divided, and responders reject offers with high frequency if they are less 
than 20% or so. This basic result has been replicated dozens of times, in several 
countries and with large variations in stakes (see Camerer and Thaler, 1995, for a 
review). 
In many experiments the ultimatum game is played sequentially. A proposer makes a 
specific offer, which is transmitted to the responder, who accepts or rejects it. If 
respondents are rational and self-interested, and proposers know that, then the unique 
subgame perfect equilibrium is for proposers to offer e and for responders to accept it. 
Note that in this analysis, there is no coordination problem because the subgame perfect 
equilibrium is unique. 
An alternative method, which is more informative about responders' preferences, is 
for the responder to precommit to a threshold "minimum acceptable offer" (MAO) which 
she will accept (and any lower offer will be rejected). When the game is played using 
the MAO method it is closely related to BOS,. and even more closely related to the "Nash 
demand game". Table 4 shows how. 
The difference is consistent with the theory that players have a heightened aversion to playing a game 
after another player has moved, which increased preference for the random device. 
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The Table shows a simplified ultimatum game in which players can choose to offer, 
and state as MA Os, only elements of { 2.50,5.00,7 .50}. If the MAO is less than or equal 
to the offer x, the payoffs are (10-x,x); otherwise they earn (0,0). 
The kinship to BOS is apparent. Along the diagonal-- the set of pure-strategy Nash 
equilibria-- the payoffs represent every feasible division of $10. Lower offers clearly 
favor proposers and higher offers favor responders. Hence, within these set of Nash 
equilibria players face a coordination game identical to the BOS. Both players prefer 
some agreement to none, but different agreements benefit them differently. 
Proposer 
offer 
2.50
5.00 
7.50
Table 4: Simplified Ultimatum Game 
2.50
7.50,2.50
5.00,5.00 
2.50,7.50
Responder MA 0 
5.00 7.50
0,0 0,0 
5.00,5.00 0,0 
2.50,7.50 2.50,7.50
The simplified ultimatum game in Table 4 is also closely related to the "Nash demand 
game", in which two players propose shares for themselves of x1 and x2, and they earn 
their shares if and only if x1 +x�lO (otherwise they earn nothing). The difference 
between the demand game and the ultimatum game is that if the proposed shares (x, and 
MAO) add to less than $10 in the ultimatum game the shortfall goes to the proposer, 
while it is discarded in the Nash demand game. In pure-strategy equilibrium there is no 
shortfall, so the pure-strategy equilibria of the two games are exactly the same. 
The close relations with the BOS and the Nash demand game emphasize that a 
coordination problem exists in the ultimatum game too. And since we know that timing 
seems to affect equilibrium selection in BOS and in related games with multiple 
equilibria (resource dilemmas and step-level public goods provision), it is natural to 
wonder whether timing affects ultimatum games too. 
There is a more specific reason to wonder about the effect of timing in ultimatum 
games. U ltimatum games using the specific-offer method seems to elicit more 
acceptances by responders, holding offers constant, than in games using the MAO 
method. This difference, to our knowledge, has not been established by a careful 
comparison but published data collected using the two different methods strongly suggest 
it (see also Schotter, Weiss, Zapater, 1994). For example, in experiments with specific 
offers virtually all offers of $4.00-$4.50 are accepted. But in experiments which elicit 
MAOsfrom responders,.it is common for a quarter or more of subjects to demand $5.00.
(In one condition in Blount & Bazerman, 1995, the median MAO was $5.) 
Figure la offers a cursory picture of how the two methods seem to differ. Figure 1 
compares cumulative distributions of MA Os from our simultaneous-move data 
(described in section III below) and rejection frequencies stitched together from several 
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different studies which all used the specific-offer method. 4 Specific-offer rejections are
less frequent for high offers-- for example, 20% of $4.25 (or larger) offers are rejected in 
the specific offer method, but 60% of those offers are rejected using the MAO method-­
and the specific offer distribution has less variance. 
However, the comparison between the specific-offer and MAO methods confounds a 
difference in the way responders' choices are measured, and a difference in timing. In 
the specific-offer method the proposers always move first, and both players know it. In 
the MAO method the players (usually) move simultaneously. One hypothesis about the 
specific-offer vs. MAO difference (if there is one) is that timing makes the difference. In 
the specific-offer method, responders know they move second and may grant a first­
mover advantage to the first-moving proposer by agreeing to accept less (as in the studies 
described above). We can test this hypothesis by using only the MAO method, but 
altering the timing of when proposers make offers. 
Figure lb  shows MAOs in proposer-first games (denoted PR) described further below, 
compared to the same specific offer rejection frequencies shown in Figure l a. The two 
distributions are substantially closer. For example, in the specific offer method the offer 
which is rejected half the time is between $3.00 and $3.50, and the corresponding offer 
in the MAO method, with proposers moving first, is $4.00. The fact that the distributions 
in Figure lb  are closer together than those in Figure la  suggests means that timing may 
account for much of the difference between specific-offer behavior and MAO method 
behavior. 
III. Ultimatum bargaining experiments
In the ultimatum game experiments, large groups of University of Chicago MBA 
subjects were recruited (often at the beginning or end of a class, n=284 in total). 
Subjects were randomly paired with one another and told they were paired with someone 
else in the same room, but they would not know who that person was. (Instructions are 
provided in the appendix.) Proposers offered a division of $10 to a responder, in 
increments of $.50. Responders indicated which offers they would accept by checking 
"accept" or "reject" from a list of all possible offers. From their acceptances we 
computed a minimum acceptable offer or MAO. Offers and MA Os were matched by the 
experimenters and subjects were paid what they earned (typically in an envelope 
distributed at the end of class, or at the beginning of the subsequent class). 
4The studies we used were Roth et al ( 1 99 1 ), Hoffman et al ( 1994, random FHSS instructions only), 
Forsythe et al ( 1994), Slonim & Roth (1995, 60sk treatment), and Cameron ( 1 995, real money 2000rp
treatment). In all these studies, there are few very low offers so estimating the rejection frequencies for 
low offers is difficult. Thus, we impose monotonicity on the rejection frequency function-- forcing the 
frequencies to rise as offers fall-- in a specific way. We begin with rejection frequencies at high offers 
(say X). As we move down to lower offers (say X-.5), if the rejection frequency falls we pool all the data 
from X and X-.5 offers, estimating a single rejection frequency for all offers in the interval (X,X-.5).
This method (which is similar to "isotonic regression") can be easily spotted because it produces flat
spots in the frequency function. 
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U ltimatum games were played in three conditions. In the SIMultaneous condition, 
proposers and responders filled out their offer and MAO forms at the same time. In the 
PR condition, proposers first handed in their offer forms, then responders filled out MAO 
forms and handed them in. Thus, in the PR condition both players know the proposer 
moved first, but responders did not know the proposer's offer. An RP condition is the 
opposite: Responders handed in MAO forms first, then proposers made offers. 
The hypothesized effects of timing, predicted by both first-mover advantage and 
virtual observability theories, are as follows: 
Offers Hl: Offer(RP) > Offer (SIM) > Offer (PR) 
MAOs: Hl:  MAO (RP)> MAO (SIM)> MAO (PR) 
Figures 2a-c show the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of MA Os in the PR, 
SIM, and RP conditions. At a glance the three cdfs look the same: There are large jumps 
around $5 (since many responders said they would accept no less than $5), plateaus from 
around $4 to $1, and another large jump around $1 or $.50. Table 5 reports descriptive 
statistics and two statistics testing whether the three distributions appear to be drawn 
from the same population. There is a clear ordering in the three means, but the standard 
deviations are large and only MA Os from the more extreme conditions, PR and RP, are 
significantly different with a p-value less than .05. 
Figure 2d plots all three MAO distributions on the same graph. Here the difference in 
conditions is a little more evident: For low offers, around $1-$3, the rejection rates vary 
from about 60% to 65% to 80% when responders move after, at the same time, or before 
proposers. Test statistics reported in Table 5 confirm that, using the more powerful 
Epps-Singleton test, the PR-RP difference is highly significant, the RP-SIM difference is 
only marginally significant (p=.07) and PR and SIM are hard to distinguish. Hence, we 
cannot reject the hypothesis of equality of MA Os in favor of the strict ordering predicted 
by Hl, but we can reject equality in favor of the extreme prediction MAO(RP) > 
MAO(PR). 
Table 5: Statistics testing equality of MAO distributions 
descriptive statistic 
condition n mean median std. dev. 
PR 75 2.82 4.25 2.33 
SIM 33 3.39 4.50 2.30 
RP 45 3.69 4.50 1.85 
statistic: 
condition 
SIM 
PR 
Epps-Singleton CF (p) 
n RP SIM 
33 9.05 (.07) 
75 19.14 (.001) 1.28 (.85) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (p) 
RP SIM 
1.35 (.51) 
2.88 (.26) 1.29 (.54) 
Note: Test statistics are Epps-Singleton characteristic function (CF) tests and one-tailed 
large-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. Test statistics are distributed chi-squared with 
1 1
4 degree of freedom under the null hypothesis of distributional equality. All p-values are 
one-tailed. 
Figures 3a-c show distributions of offers. The offer distributions are very similar since, 
as in most studies, offers are tightly clustered around $5. There is a slight tendency for 
lower offers in the PR condition (and a few more super-generous offers above $5 in the
RP condition), but no differences in the three conditions are significant. Hence, we 
cannot reject the hypothesis of equality of offers in favor of the timing-based alternative 
Hl. 
Overall, the ultimatum data show only a modest effect of timing. MA Os are indeed 
lower when responders know they move second, and are higher when they move first, 
but not by much and only the PR-RP difference is significant. Offers do not budge much 
at all. 
Two other studies report evidence of timing effects. Bagai (1992) collected MAOs 
when subjects were told a division was proposed "earlier this semester" or "will [be] 
propose[d]". The "earlier" group, corresponding to our PR, had mean MAOs of $2.34 
and the "will propose" group, corresponding to RP, had mean of MA Os of $1.69. The 
difference is in the opposite in direction of ours, and is insignificant. 
Blount (in press) also changed timing (though the change in timing was deliberately 
confounded with a change in subjects' knowledge of the distribution of offers from which 
an offer would be drawn). Her data suggest a timing effect which is in the same direction 
as our SIM-PR difference, but larger: Sixty percent of the responders in the PR 
condition, who received an offer in an envelope stapled to their response sheet, accepted 
$1 or less. The corresponding figure is only 28% in a separate simultaneous-move study. 
While this difference in MAOs is dramatic (the two cdfs are much further apart than ours 
in Figure 2d), the low sample size in the SIM condition limits test power (large sample 
KS statistic=4.74, p=.09 by a one-tailed test). 
Taken together, Blount's study and ours show that a weak first-mover advantage 
appears to drive MAOs down if responders know an offer has already been made and, 
more significantly in our data, to raise MA Os if responders know they move first. 
(Bagai's result is opposite, and puzzling.) The effect is modest in size, however, is only 
significant in the most extreme comparison between responder-last RP and responder­
first PR conditions. 
The effect of timing here is also much smaller than the BOS data reported above. The 
BOS results are probably much larger because timing does not compete with fairness as a 
selection principle in those games. Ultimatums are more like resource dilemmas in which 
equal resource-use is an obvious fair point. In those dilemmas the effect of timing 
should therefore be muted by the strength of equal-use as a focal principle. Indeed, the 
effects of timing reported by Rapoport et al, described above, are more like our 
ultimatum results in magnitude, and substantially weaker than in BOS. This does not 
mean timing effects can be ignored. Instead, the overall picture from BOS, resource 
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dilemmas, and ultimatum games shows that many structural features of games act as 
selection principles. Perhaps unsurprisingly, equal-payoff is a strong principle, and has a 
bigger effect than the subtle effect of timing. 
IV. Weak-link coordination game experiments
Our major contribution is to distinguish virtual observablity from the first-mover 
advantage theory by conducting experiments on coordination games. Table 6 shows 
payoffs in one such game, the "weak-link" game, first studied by Van Huyck, Battalio & 
Beil (1990). 
In the weak-link game, groups of three subjects choose numbers from 1 to 7. The row 
player's payoff depends on the number she chose (shown in the rows) and on the smallest 
number chosen by any player in the group (hence, the term "weak link" game). The 
payoffs are an increasing function of the smallest number chosen, and a decreasing 
function of how far the row player is from the smallest number. Since everyone wants to 
be no higher than the minimum, and wants the minimum to be as large as possible, the 
game requires coordination. Every number is a Nash equilibrium and the equilibria are 
Pareto-ranked: X provides a higher payoffs for everyone than X-1; choosing 7 is the 
highest payoff of all. 
Table 6: Weak-Link Game 
SMALLEST VALUE OF 
XCHOSEN 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
7 1.30 1.10 0.90 0.70 0.50 0.30 0.10 
YOUR 6 1.20 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 
CHOICE 5 1.10 0.70 0.50 0.30 
OFX 4 0.80 0.60 0.40 
3 0.90 0.50 
2 0.60 
1 0.70 
The weak link game models situations in which group production is determined by the 
level of the lowest-level input. Examples include keeping a secret, meeting a group at a 
restaurant which will not seat anyone until everyone in the group has arrived, output in 
"high reliability" organizations in which a single failure or low-quality component causes 
disaster, or submitting chapters to a book which cannot be printed until all the chapters 
arrive (e.g., Camerer & Knez, in press). 
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In the weak-link game, virtual observability implies that if players move in a specified 
order, the first player will act as if others see his move and best-respond to it (and 
similarly for the second player). Denote the first and second player's choices by X1 and 
X2. Then the third player will choose min(X 1,X2), so the second player will choose 
X2=X1 (choosing less would mean creating a lower minimum), and the first player will 
choose XI =7. Since the third player "follows" the second, and the second follows the 
first, the first player can "create" a minimum of 7 simply by choosing 7 to begin with. 
Virtual observability therefore implies an efficient outcome in the weak-link game. 
Notice, however, that the outcome in which everyone chooses 7 provides no first­
mover advanta�e, per se. The first mover does prefer the equilibrum of 7s, but this 
equilibrium provides no special advantage for her, since others prefer it too. So first­
mover advantage has no use as a selection principle. (Put differently, it coincides with 
payoff dominance so it has no special focal power, as it does in the BOS and common­
pool public goods games.) 
Thus, we can use weak-link games to distinguish the first-mover advantage and virtual 
observability theories. Virtual observability predicts that coordination will improve, to 
choices near seven, when we move from simultaneous moves to sequential moves which 
are unobservable. The first mover advantage theory predicts no difference. We can write 
this formally, denoting the distribution of number choices by D(.), and representing 
stochastic dominance relation among distributions by A>sdB (the distribution A 
stochastically dominates B). Since cumulative distributions with more choices of high 
numbers will be stochastically dominated by distributions with more low-number 
choices, we have: 
First mover advantage H2fma: D(SIM) = D(SEQ) <sd D(OBS) 
Virtual observability H2v0: D(SIM) <sd D(SEQ) = D(OBS) 
Experiments were conducted with groups of Caltech undergraduates (n=60) recruited 
from a list of subjects who had participated in previous experiments, and UCLA 
undergraduates (n=54) recruited from ail accounting class. 
In each session 6-18 subjects sat in a room together. Subjects were randomly assigned 
numbers, and letters A, B, or G, and were formed into three-person groups. They did not 
know which other subjects were in their group. After reading the instructions (see 
Appendix) out loud to all subjects, the subjects answered two questions about how 
different choices led to different payoffs. When all subjects had answered correctly, the 
experiment began. 
Groups participated in one of three conditions. In the SIMultaneous condition, all 
three subjects made their choices at the same time. After each round, forms recording the 
choices were collected, the experimenters recorded choices by others in the group on the 
same forms, and the forms were returned to the subjects. To ensure comparability with 
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the other conditions, subjects learned the choices of each of the other two subjects in 
their group. 
In the SEQuential condition subjects moved in a specified order-- A first, then B, then 
C-- but later-moving subjects did not know what the earlier choices were. To help ensure 
that subjects could not tell when others in the room made their choices (so that subjects 
could not easily identify who might be in their group), as the A subjects recorded their 
choices the B and C subjects marked an "X" in a box on their forms. This way, all 
subjects made a mark on their sheets at the same time. After the A subjects had all 
marked choices, the B subjects made their choices (and A and C subjects marked Xs), 
then C subjects made choices. As in the SIM condition, after all subjects made choices 
their forms were collected, filled out to show the choices of others in each group, and 
returned to subjects. 
In the OBServable condition, subjects knew the moves of all players in their group 
who moved before them. After A subjects made choices the forms were collected, and A 
choices were told to B and C subjects. After B subjects made choices their choices were 
told to C subjects. 
The OBS condition provides an empirical benchmark against which the SEQ 
condition can be judged. The test is simple: First-mover advantage theories predict the 
SEQ condition will be like SIM, not like OBS. Virtual observability predicts SEQ will 
be like OBS, not like SIM. 
Besides being useful for gauging the effect of timing, the OBS condition is 
independently interesting because previous experiments with 3- or more-person weak 
link games show widespread coordination failure (i.e., failure of all subjects in a group to 
choose 7; e.g., Van Huyck, Battalio & Beil, 1990; Knez & Camerer, 1994). But in the 
OBS condition subgame perfection (along with self-interest) uniquely picks out the 
equilibrium in which everyone chooses 7. 
However, to reach this equilibrium requires A subjects to think Bs and Cs are rational, 
and to think that Bs think Cs are rational, so choices by A's may help place a bound on 
the number of levels of iterated rationality people are willing to bet on (see also Ho, 
Weigelt & Camerer, 1996). Furthermore, the choices of Cs are useful to test whether 
players are self-interested. If subjects want to earn more money than others, for example, 
then they might not best-respond to previous choices (picking lower numbers than others 
did) in order to increase their relative standing. Choices by C's provide a direct test of 
whether these status tastes are large relative to the financial incentive provided by paying 
money. 
Thus, the OBS condition provides evidence of whether players coordinate better when 
they play after observing the moves of others, the number of levels of iterated rationality 
they are willing to bet on, and whether forces other than self-interest affect their choices. 
To convey the data compactly, we averaged the choices of A, B, and C subjects in 
each round, in each condition, for each subject pool. Figures 4a-c show the data from 
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Caltech subjects. In the SIM condition (Figure 4a), choices averaged just above 6, and 
drifted slowly upward over eight rounds. By round six, three of the four groups had 
coordinated on 7. 
In the OBS condition (Figure 4c), choices converged to 7 sharply and immediately. 
The SEQ condition results (Figure 4b) are between those of SIM and OBS. SEQ choices 
in the first four periods are slow to converge upward (as in SIM) but in the last four 
periods 93 of96 SEQ choices were 7s (as in OBS). Overall, the data suggest some 
predictive accuracy to virtual observability. But the test is not very powerful because of 
a "ceiling effect"-- average SIM and OBS choices are both close to 7, so it is hard to tell
whether SEQ is closer to SIM or to OBS. 
Figures 5a-c show data from UCLA undergraduates. Choices are lower and more 
dispersed than the Caltech choices. 5 And the SEQ choices are closer to OBS choices, as
the virtual observability hypothesis H2vo predicts. 
Two other comparisons suggest that SEQ is more similar to OBS than to SIM, 
supporting the virtual observability prediction. First, there is a modest effect of subject 
position on average choices in the UCLA data. In the OBS condition, the average A 
choices (shown with triangles in Figure Sc) are slightly above B and C choices (shown 
with squares and circles). This means the B and C players are never choosing bigger 
numbers than the first-mover A did; and sometimes their numbers are lower. In the SEQ 
condition there is a weak effect of position too-- the average A choices are highest in the 
first three periods. 
Second, since the minima in each group are sensitive to outliers in the left tail of the 
choice distributions, the minima may be a good place to look for distributional 
differences that are not strikingly apparent by looking at the position-averaged data in 
Figures 5a-c. Table 7 shows the minima from all groups in all rounds, for the UCLA data 
(medians of the minima are shown in parentheses). The round 1 row lists minima of 
each group in each condition, from low to high. Subsequent rows (representing later 
rounds) list a group's minima in the same column as in the first row. If you want to track 
a particular group, read straight down vertically. For example, the rightmost group in the 
SIM condition that chose 4 in round 1, then chose minima of 5, 6, 7, and 7. 
5We felt we lacked control over subjects' incentives in the UCLA subject pool, for several reasons. Some
subjects reported in debriefing that they thought some of the choices we fed back to them were faked by 
us. Since such false feedback is common in psychology experiments, their beliefs are not unfounded, and 
illustrate the credibility pollution that can harm fellow experimenters when deception is used too freely.  
Other subjects reported that they deliberately chose lower numbers to "do the best" and make others in 
their group earn less , at small expense to themselves. We excluded one group from the OBS condition 
because two of three subjects reported that they were deliberately choosing low numbers to harm 
fraternity brothers they guessed (correctly) were in their group. Their choices resulted in minima of 
3,3,3, 1 ,  and 6; including those data would only bolster our conclusion that SEQ data are similar to OBS, 
by lowering the average OBS choices. 
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round 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
all 
Table 7: Minima from UCLA weak-link groups by rounds 
(medians in parentheses) 
SIM 
13333444 (3) 
13445345 (4) 
13466346 ( 4) 
13466147 (4) 
13477147 (4) 
(4) 
SEO 
condition 
OBS 
11134447 (4) 
14741557 (4.5) 
25764577 (5.5) 
16773777 (7) 
17773677 (7) 
(5) 
34555667 (5) 
366677 67 ( 6) 
43637777 (6.5) 
55547777 (6) 
77317177 (7) 
(6) 
In the UCLA data, the SEQ and OBS conditions reach minima of 7 a total of 40% 
and 43% of the time, respectively much more frequently than in the SIM condition (only 
8% ). The medians <;>f the minima in each round are always strictly larger in SEQ than in 
SIM. Across all rounds, the median of the minima in the SEQ condition, 5, is halfway 
between the SIM and OBS medians of 4 and 6. With respect to minima, SEQ is squarely 
between SIM and OBS. 
Figures 6a-b and 7a-b show cumulative distribution functions of data pooled into early 
and later periods (and excluding the last round, which sometimes appears to have a 
different distribution). These distributions suggest, roughly, that in earlier periods the 
SEQ condition is closer to SIM-- timing per se does not matter-- but in later periods SEQ 
moves away from SIM, closer to OBS.
To do more formal hypothesis tests using all the data, we combined data from the 
earlier and later rounds of each session, excluding the last round . Obviously these data 
are not truly independent from round to round, but no simple correction for dependence 
is available for better statistical control. (The conservative method of examining only 
first-period results has too little power for our sample sizes to detect any differences at 
all.) 
Table 8 shows results from Epps-Singleton (ES) characteristic function tests and 
Kolmogorov-Smimov (KS) tests. All tests are one-tailed tests in which the alternative 
hypothesis is that the condition named first in the left column produces lower numbers 
than the second condition (the prediction of virtual observability). 
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Table 8: Tests for differences among weak-link treatments 
subject pool Calt�Qh UCLA 
12eriods 1 -3 4-:Z 1 -2 3-4 
SIM-SEQ n l..n2 72,72 26.96 48,48 48,48 
ES test (p) 3.09 ( .56) 1 2.23 ( .02) 1 3 .20 ( .02) 9 .49 ( .05) 
KS test (p) . 1 1  ( .94) 4.08 ( . 1 6) 8 . 17  ( .02) 10 .67 ( .0 1 )  
SIM-OBS n l..n2 72,36 9(2,48 48,48 48,48 
ES test (p) 1 2.52 (.02) 1 2.26 ( .02) 1 3 .26 ( .0 1 )  7 .42 ( . 1 2) 
KS test (p) 5 .35 (.03) 4.50 (. 1 1 ) 10 .67 ( .0 1 )  4. 17  ( . 1 4)
SEQ-OBS n l..n2 72,36 96,48 48,48 48,48 
ES test (p) 17 . 17  ( .0 1 )  1 .33  ( . 86) 22.21  ( .00 1 )  6.27 ( . 1 8)
KS test (p) 8 . 17  ( .02) . 35 ( .86) 2.67 ( .27) .38 ( . 84) 
The tests corroborate what is apparent from Figures 7-8 .  In earlier periods the SEQ 
condition is clearly different from OBS-- contrary to virtual observability-- but in later 
periods SEQ and OBS cannot be distinguished statistically, while SIM and SEQ can. It 
appears that virtual observability does not "work" right away, but begins to work as 
subjects learn. 
V. Conclusions 
This paper proceeds from five related observations. First, bargaining games with 
multiple equilibria involve some degree of coordination because both players would 
rather agree on something than disagree and get nothing. Second, because bargaining 
requires coordination, selection principles which direct players' attention to particular 
outcomes will help solve the coordination problem. Third, first-mover advantage is a 
kind of selection principle, viz., players moving first get a larger bargaining share; later­
movers know that and acquiesce. Fourth, the first-mover's choice need not be observed 
by the second mover, if the second mover has enough confidence to simply infer it. 
Hence, there can be first-mover advantages without observing first moves. Fifth, virtual 
observability-- in which players act as if they can tell what those who moved earlier did 
(and early-movers know this and exploit it)-- makes the same prediction as a theory 
based on first-mover advantage in bargaining games, but makes a special prediction in 
coordination games (where equilibria are Pareto-ranked). 
Therefore, we tested for first-mover advantage and virtual observability in bargaining 
and coordination games. In ultimatum bargaining, we used the "strategy method" by 
requiring responders to indicate a minimum acceptable offer (MAO). Both theories 
predictthat when proposers clearly move first, offers would rise and MA Os would fall, 
the opposite patterns would result when proposers move last, and the data from a 
standard simultaneous-move treatment would lie in between. In six sessions with a total 
of 286 subjects, offers did not change much across the three timing conditions but MA Os 
did change, somewhat, in the direction we predicted. When responders move first 
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(second) they demand more (less), though the differences between demands in these two 
conditions and simultaneous-move demands were insignificant. 
In weak-link coordination games we tested whether knowing that others had gone first 
would improve coordination. Generally, the results from the sequential (but 
unobservable) move games lie between the results from simultaneous-move games and 
games with observable moves. Our results are not highly significant and differ 
substantially between two subject pools (undergraduate students at Caltech and UCLA). 
But if our result can be replicated in further work (e.g., two-player stag hunt games) then 
virtual observability is the right explanation for timing effects (since it subsumes first­
mover advantage as a special case and hence, explains the BOS and ultimatum results as
well). 
Our results have several implications. 
Sequential coordination 
The results on weak-link coordination suggest that simultaneity of choices is an 
important source of coordination failure. Spreading choices out in time, even when 
previous choices are not observed, can improve coordination (as conjectured by Bryant, 
1983) .  When previous choices are observed, then subgame perfection selects the 
efficient outcome uniquely, but several levels of iterated rationality are needed (in the 
three-person game) to achieve the efficient outcome. That is, for the first player A to 
choose 7 she must be rational, believe that players B and C are, and believe that B 
believes C is rational. For B to reciprocate and choose 7 as well requires her to be 
rational and believe C is. For C to reciprocate requires only that she be rational. The 
frequency of coordination failure in the observable condition casts doubt on the 
willingness  of players to bet on these levels of iterated rationality, as has been observed 
in many other games (e.g., Ho, Weigelt & Camerer, 1996) . 
Fairness and timing 
Previous experimental findings on ultimatum bargaining are often characterized as 
showing that responders are willing to give up money to punish proposers they think 
have treated the unfairly. The timing results we report suggest this interpretation is 
incomplete. If distaste for unfairness drives responders to state positive MAOs, why do 
their MAOs fall substantially when they know proposers move first? Within the fairness 
framework, the obvious answer is that a low off er is more fair when proposers move first 
than when proposers move second. But this answer suggests that fairness  means "fair 
exercise of advantage", and thus cannot be competely decoupled from variables that alter 
advantage. 
Elicitation methods and timing cues 
Our results have some implications for how game theory experiments are conducted 
and their results interpreted. The first important point is that previous studies have 
confounded timing and "response mode", viz., confronting responders with specific 
offers vs. eliciting an MAO. The MAO method has generally been used in simultaneous 
move games whereas the specific-offer method makes clear that proposers move first. 
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There is a sense from this literature (substantiated in Figure l a) that MAOs are higher 
than corresponding rejections of specific offers, which suggests a dynamic inconsistency 
in which subjects may state an MAO of $5, say (a mode in many samples), but actually 
accept less than $5 when faced with a specific offer.6 We think, instead, that MAOs are
inflated partly because the order of timing is ambiguous. When we made it clear that 
responders move second, in our PR treatment, MA Os fell substantially and almost half 
accepted $.50 or zero. 
Once simultaneous-move ultimatum games are seen as coordination games, the 
possibilities that wording, methods by which roles are assigned, and other variables 
might affect outcomes become natural since all these features could create different focal 
points or act as selection principles. For example, Blount and Bazerman ( 1 995) elicit 
MA Os two different ways: One method asks responders to directly record an MAO, 
implicitly evaluating their outcomes independently, and the second method asks them to 
circle which offers they would accept from a list of possible offers, implicitly evaluating 
outcomes comparatively. They find substantially higher MA Os in the direct method 
(median $5) than in the list method (median $2.50) .  A timing-based interpretation of 
their finding is that the list method contains a proposer-first timing cue which the direct 
method does not clearly have. Similarly, Boles & Messick ( 1 990) found that when offers 
were physically presented to subjects-- dollar bills were laid in front of responders-- then 
offers were accepted more frequently. Physical presentation may again act as a timing 
cue. Notice that in this timing-based account, the elicitation method does not affect 
expressions of preferences per se, but instead affects responders' beliefs about timing, 
and hence about what offers proposers will make and what responders "deserve". So 
elicitation methods act as selection principles. (This claim does not deny a further role 
for elicitation, per se, which is well-established in choice experiments which are not 
games. We simply claim that in games, some elicitation differences may include timing 
cues which trigger first-mover advantage principles or virtual observability reasoning. )  
Timing and the psychology of belief formation in games 
Our findings should pique the curiosity of game theorists (and psychologists too) 
about how players actually form beliefs in games. As pointed out at the start, the 
standard game-theoretic model draws no special distinctions among a player's beliefs 
about what another player did, is doing, or will do. But the psychology of reasoning 
suggests several ways in which these thinking processes might differ. Two relevant ideas 
are causal illusion and ambiguity-aversion, mentioned above. A third idea is that players 
may be better at reasoning backward, about events known to have already happened, than 
reasoning forward. Evidence from psychology experiments (e.g., Mitchell, Russo & 
Pennington, 1 989) shows that description of possible outcomes of previously-occurring 
events is often richer and more complex than description of later-occurring events: The 
past is easier to "imagine" than the future. In the same way, B and C subjects in the 
weak-link games, moving second and third, might be able to imagine that earlier-moving 
A subjects will chose high numbers more easily than if those A subjects move at the 
same time as B and C do. 
6Bagai ( 1 992) tested for such reversals explicitly, and did not find any from 34 subjects.
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A similar point can be made about other features of games which could affect belief 
formation, but are conventionally assumed not to. The psychological distinction between 
chance moves by nature and moves by another person is an example. The convention for 
modelling imperfect information games is to treat these two sources of uncertainty as 
equivalent. But players may reason about them differently (e.g. , Blount, in press). 
Recognizing the distinction, and exploring it both experimentally and formally, can only 
improve the descriptive accuracy of game theory. 
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Appendix: Ultimatum Instructions 
In this experiment you will either be a proposer or a responder. The proposer has to 
decide how to divide up a ten dollar bill between him or herself and the responder The 
proposer makes an offer of X dollars, where X is divisible by fifty cents. If the 
responder accepts then the responder receives $X and the proposer receives $10 - $X. If 
the responder rejects the offer then both the responder and the proposer receive zero. 
You have been randomly assigned the role of proposer or responder. If you are a 
proposer you have an OFFER sheet, if you are a responder you have an ACCEPTANCE 
sheet. At the top of your sheet you are given an ID number. For example, if your ID 
number is P12 then you are proposer number 12, while if your ID number is R12 then 
you are responder number 12. Finally, proposer P12 will be making an offer to 
responder R12. Your ID number is strictly confidential. Moreover, at no time during or 
after the experiment will you know the identity of the person you are paired with. 
Treatment RP 
There will be two steps in the experiment. First, each responder will record the 
minimum offer that he or she is willing to accept from the proposer. The number the 
responder writes down is binding. That is, if the offer the responder receives is greater 
than or equal to this number, then the offer is accepted. However, if the offer is less than 
this number then the offer is rejected. Also, the number the responders record should be 
in increments of fifty cents. Once all the acceptance sheets have been collected, each 
proposer will then record their offer to the responder on their OFFER sheet, where the 
offer should be in increments of fifty cents. 
Treatment SIM 
Each responder will record the minimum offer that he or she is willing to accept from the 
proposer. The number the responder writes down is binding. That is, if the offer the 
responder receives is greater than or equal to this number, then the offer is accepted. 
However, if the offer is less than this number then the offer is rejected. Also, the number 
the responders record should be in increments of fifty cents. While the responders are 
making their decisions, each proposer will record their off er to the responder on their 
OFFER sheet, where the offer should be in increments of fifty cents. 
Treatment PR 
There will be two steps in the experiment. First, each proposer will record their offer on 
their OFFER sheet, where the offer should be in increments of fifty cents. Once all the 
offers have been collected, each responder should record the minimum offer that he or 
she is willing to accept from the proposer. The number the responder writes down is 
binding. That is, if the offer the responder receives is greater than or equal to this 
number, then the offer is accepted. However, if the offer is less than this number then the 
offer is rejected. Again, the number the responders record should be in increments of 
fifty cents. 
Once all of the record sheets have been collected, your record sheet will then be 
paired with your partner's as indicated by your identification number. The experimenter 
25 
will then determine whether or not offers are accepted or rejected and how much each 
participant receives. Your cash payoff will then be placed in an envelope and at the end 
of the session you should pick up the envelope corresponding to your identification 
number. 
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